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THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO "SWEETHEART"
MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS: PROTECTING THE
CONDOMINIUM PURCHASER
THOMAS G.

KREBS* **

The American consumer has been protected by his government in
the purchase of most of the relatively inexpensive items which are
offered to the general public.' However, until very recently he has
received little or no effective protection in the purchase of a condominium. 2 One particular source of problems for the residential condominium purchaser has been management contracts executed by developers
prior to the transfer of control of the condominium association to the
unit owners. All too frequently these contracts bind the association to a
specific managing agent or management firm for a number of years
with no express right to renegotiate or cancel. This situation may be
further exacerbated if the managing agent is a subsidiary of, or related
to, the developer who originally executed the contract. The long-term
duration of these so-called "sweetheart" contracts constitutes an infringement upon rights of the association and the unit owners to contract on their own behalf.3 Moreover, because these contracts may be
self-serving for the developer-manager, he may include terms which
are commercially unreasonable.
Since most of the original state condominium legislation did not
address the management contract problem, condominium associations
and individual owners sought redress in the courts. However, this approach did not produce any significant relief from the "sweetheart"
* Partner, Krebs and Langowski; Instructor, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law; J.D.
lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law; member of the Illinois Bar.
** The author expresses appreciation to William T. Curtis, law clerk to Judge Joseph
Schneider, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Ill., for assistance in research and writing.
1. See, e.g., The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976); The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 261-272 (1977).
2. Prior to the enactment of various condominium acts, consumers were protected primarily
by general real property statutes such as the Illinois Conveyances Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
§§ 1-37h (1977) and the Michigan Real and Personal Property Code, MIcH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 554.1-554.41 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
3. For a general discussion of this problem area prior to the enactment of recent legislation
see Note, Areas of Dispute in Condominium Law, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979 (1976); 28 MIAMI

L. REV. 451 (1974); 27 MIAMI L. REV. 451 (1973); Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 613 (1976).
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contracts. 4 In response, several state legislatures have enacted "secondgeneration" condominium acts which are intended to solve this problem.5 In addition to these state enactments, various municipal governments have passed ordinances aimed at the same problems, 6 Congress
has proposed a federal Condominium Act, 7 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed a Uniform Condominium Act.8
These legislative responses vary greatly in their overall approach
to solving the "sweetheart" contract problem. However, each approach
is composed of at least one of four precepts. This article will analyze
and compare the four principles and will discuss the adequacy of each
to deal with the problem of these management contracts, while balancing the interests of the developer and the purchasers. 9 Close scrutiny of
these "second-generation" statutes will be helpful in refining the law in
this area and will aid those states which still are operating under "firstgeneration" statutes in amending their laws.
BACKGROUND

Although reported decisions dealing specifically with the problem
of management contracts are relatively few in number, a brief survey of
the more important decisions in Florida' I will serve to illustrate the
problems purchasers have faced in challenging these contracts. Much
of the difficulty encountered by condominium owners and associations
in seeking relief from onerous contracts in Florida resulted from the
4. See text accompanying notes 11-25, infra.
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-67 through 47-90c (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.101-718.508
(West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601e through 85-1645e (1978); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 514A-I through 514A-94 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 301-331 (1977 & Supp. 1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1121 through 9-1142 (West Supp. 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 11-101 through 11-128 (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 559.1-559.39 (West 1967 &
Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.01-515.29 (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.50091.690 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-15-1 through 43-15-19 (1967), 43-15A-I through
43-15A-27 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-8-3 through 57-8-36 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE
§§ 55-79.39 through 55-79.103 (Supp. 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. 703.01-703.38 (West Supp. 1978).
These statutes are intended to deal with a wide range of problems relating to condominium developments, among which is the problem of management contracts.
6. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE. ch. 100.2, §§ 1-2 (1977).
7. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, H.R. 12124, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the proposed Condominium Act of 1978].
8. UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM ACT §§ 1-101 through 5-110 (7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 97
(1978)) [hereinafter referred to as the U.C.A.].
9. This discussion will be limited to new residential condominiums. Because conversions,
recreational condominiums, cooperative apartments and condominiums sold as investments present special problems which require distinct solutions, they are beyond the scope of this article.
10. The bulk of relevant case law predating the "second-generation" statutes arose in Florida. This preponderance of decisions emanating from Florida courts may be explained by the
early popularity of the condominium form of home ownership in that state.
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1967 Florida appellate court decision in Fountainview v. Bell.II In that
case a condominium association had brought an action for rescission of
a management contract and cancellation of a recreational lease, both of
which contained allegedly inflated price terms and were of unreasonably lengthy duration. The association alleged that the agreements in
question were executed by the defendants while acting in the capacities
of directors and officers of the association prior to the initial sales of
units, and that the defendants derived private or secret profits from the
agreements. Despite the fact that the association was organized as a
not-for-profit corporation, the court held that the case was governed by
Florida corporation law as it pertained to corporations organized for
profit.12 The court reasoned, albeit with some reluctance, that since the
defendants were the sole members of the association at the time the
agreements were formed, the plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable
relief. 13
The Fountainview decision has been followed, with continued reluctance, by other Florida courts in upholding similar agreements. In
Wechsler v. Goldman,' 4 for example, a group of condominium owners
brought an action for cancellation or termination of a ninety-nine year
lease of recreational facilities. This lease had been executed by defendant promoters, as directors of the association, with a corporation also
owned or controlled by the defendants. The individual plaintiffs in
Wechsler were not informed of the lease when they executed preliminary sales contracts, but expressly accepted the lease when they subsequently executed the closing contracts. The court held that their
knowledge was sufficient to bind the plaintiffs,' 5 but also stated that
"[wihat occurred in this instance and in the Fountainview case may indicate a need for legislative action to amend the Condominium Act to
6
prevent unfair dealing by promoters of condominium associations."'
I1. 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. App. 1967), cert. discharged, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
12. The Fountainview court relied on the 1930 Florida Supreme Court decision in Lake Mabel Development Corp. v. Bird, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 356 (1930). In Lake Mabel, a corporation had
defended a mortgage foreclosure proceeding by alleging that the underlying transaction was
tainted by the self-dealing of the promoters of the corporation in selling land owned by themselves
to the corporation at a generous profit. The court held that the answer was insufficient at law,
stating that the corporation could not:
while its promoters own all its outstanding stock, avoid in equity a purchase of property
sold to it by its promoters at a large profit, represented by stock of the corporation issued
to such promoters, since the corporation thus has full knowledge of the facts and the
rights of innocent purchasers of stock have not arisen.
99 Fla. at 257, 126 So. at 358.
13. 203 So. 2d at 659.
14. 214 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. App. 1968).
15. ld
16. Id. (citations omitted). See also Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Condominium Assoc.,
Inc. v. Saul J. Morgan Enterprises, Inc., 301 So. 2d 783 (Fla. App. 1974).
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The same reasoning was utilized by the Florida Supreme Court in
Point East Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 17
without reference to either Fountainview or Wechsler. At issue in Point
East were a twenty-five year management contract and a ninety-nine
year recreational lease which the developer had executed with itself on
behalf of the association. Present unit owners and members of the association sought rescission of both the contract and the lease, damages
for fraud, damages for breach of a fiduciary duty, and damages for
breach of contract. 18 The trial court ruled in plaintiffs favor. However, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court19 and stated:
Admittedly, a prospective purchaser had no option as to the management contract, but he knew or should have known that the contract
was part of the purchase price of his condominium unit. Considered
in that light, enforcement of the contract cannot
20 be said to work a
hardship on the present condominium owners.
In Avila South Condominium Association v. Kappa Corp.,21 the
Florida Supreme Court held that an unjust enrichment theory might be
successful. However, the court limited recovery under this theory to
the situation in which the "interested" developer receives funds without
"the consent of a substantial number of the individuals comprising the
association."2 2 The court did not expand on what would constitute
"consent." If it is sufficient for a developer to show that a copy of a
management contract was included in the papers tendered at the time
of sale and was not rejected by the purchaser, the individuals of the
association will have gained little ground, if any. The impact of this
decision will not be known until the courts have had the opportunity to
define consent.
These types of agreements have been challenged on several other
theories, but there has been no clear success. Challenges by residential
condominium associations under the Federal Securities Act have
failed. 23 However, the management contract has not been at issue in
17. 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973).
18. Id at 629.
19. In reversing the lower court, the Point East court applied the reasoning set forth in Lake
Mable, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 356 (1930). See note 12, supra.
20. 282 So. 2d at 629.
21. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
22. Id at 607.
23. The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter referred to as SEC] has issued
guidelines, 38 FED. REG. 1735, SEC Release No. 5347, Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 25:2501 Jan.
4, 1973, which indicate that a condominium offering will not be considered a securities offering
absent some "collateral arrangements" which would qualify as an investment contract under the
criteria of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The "collateral arrangements" would
include, but not necessarily be limited to: an offering and sale with "emphasis on the economic
benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter. . . [in] rental
of the units;" an offering of a rental pool; and an offering which requires the purchaser to "hold
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any reported decision to date. Although characterization of the forced
acceptance of contracts at the time of closing the sale as an illegal tying
arrangement has been held to state a cause of action, the proof needed
24
to prevail on this theory has not been established.
Moreover, it is clear that absent remedial legislation, condominium purchasers would be continually victimized by onerous long term
contractual agreements to which they were not parties and for which
they have no effective remedy. This concern is reflected in the legislative purpose enunciated in the proposed Condominium Act of 1978:
It is therefore the purpose of the Act to establish national standards for consumer protection and disclosure together with appropriate enforcement procedures, to encourage States to adopt statutes
which will provide substantially equivalent or greater consumer protection, and to correct and prevent continuing abuses including abusive use of long-term
leasing of recreation and other condominium
25
related facilities.

LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES: FOUR PRECEPTS

The apparent need for protection for condominium purchasers has
led to legislation in fourteen states. 26 This legislation is aimed at limithis unit available for rental for any part of the year, [or to] use an exclusive rental agent," or which
materially restricts the purchaser's " 'occupancy' or rental of his unit."
Since the above types of agreements are not normally associated with the strictly residential
development to which this article is addressed, it is not likely that a purchase agreement with a
management contract appended would bring these developments within the purview of the SEC.
See also, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,447-78,449 (1972); Note, Securities Regulation of Condominium Offerings, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148 (1974).
24. Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976). The defendants in Miller were the
manager and developer of the condominium and served as controlling officers and directors of the
owners association for six years. The contract provided for their fees to increase in relation to the
cost of living index. Id at 394-95. The court held that the complaint established a prima facie
showing of a tying arrangement actionable under section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Id at 397. See also Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v.
Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977); Jones v. 247 East Chestnut
Properties, 1975-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,491 (N.D. 111.1974). The court in Jones held that
condominium and management services were "generally different products" and that a claim
under section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976), was clearly stated by the
complaint. However, the court refused to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment, citing
the need for more evidence regarding the economic impact of the tying arrangement on the relevant market and the effect of the arrangement on interstate commerce. 1975-2 TRADE CASES
60,491 at 67,162-67,163.
25. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 101(b).
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-67 through 47-90c (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.101-718.508
(West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601e through 85-1645e (1978); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 514A-1 through 514A-94 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 301-331 (1977 & Supp. 1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1121 through 9-1142 (West Supp. 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 11-101 through 11-128 (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 559.1-559.39 (West 1967 &
Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.01-515.29 (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.50091.690 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-15-1 through 43-15-19 (1967), 43-15A-1 through
43-15A-27 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-8-3 through 57-8-36 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

ing the potential for abuse, without unduly burdening the developer.
These statutes utilize a combination of four basic precepts. Simply
stated, they are: automatic termination of the management contract;
compulsory transfer of control over the association; mandatory disclosure of the existence and/or terms of such contracts; and governmental
supervision of condominium offerings.
Thirteen states have chosen to limit the term which a management
contract may run either by providing for cancellation, without cause,
by the association or by setting a specific time limit. 2 7 Both the
U.C.A. 28 and the proposed Condominium Act of 1978 have similar
provisions. 29 Specific provisions for the transfer of control of the association from the declarant to the unit owners have been enacted in six
states 30 and proposed in the U.C.A. 3 1 and the proposed Condominium
Act of 1978.32 Twelve states, 3 3 the U.C.A., 34 the proposed Condominium Act of 197835 and the Chicago city ordinance, 36 have opted for
some form of mandatory disclosure. Finally, statutes in five states provide for supervision of the offering and selling process by some governmental agency. 37 The proposed Condominium Act of 1978 also
§§

55-79.39 through 55-79.103 (Supp. 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 703.01-703.38 (West Supp. 1978)
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-74b(a) (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.302 (West Supp. 1978);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-84 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1138 (West Supp. 1976); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-125 (Supp. 1977);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.195(2) (West
Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.557 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-15A-24 (Supp.
1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-16.5(2) (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 55-79.74(b) (Supp. 1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 703.35 (West Supp. 1978). See text accompanying notes 40-52, infra.
28. U.C.A., supra note 8, at § 3-105.
29. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at §§ 205(a)(I 1), 209(a)-209(e).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-74a (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.301(1) (West Supp. 1978);
GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1633e(a), 85-1633e(c) (1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-16.5(i) (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 55-79.74(a) (Supp. 1976). See text
accompanying notes 53-59, infra.
31. U.C.A., supra note 8, at §§ 3-103(c) through 3-103(d).
32. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 205(a)(3)(i)-205(a)(3)(ii).
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-71b (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.50 (West Supp. 1978); GA.
CODE ANN. § 85-1643e (1978); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 514A-61 through 514A-62 (Supp. 1977); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 322 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1140 (West Supp. 1978); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-124 (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.215 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.602, 91.652, 91.656, 91.664,
91.667 (1977); VA. CODE § 55-79.90 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.33 (West Supp. 1978).
34. U.C.A., supra note 8, at §§ 4-102, 4-106.
35. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at §§ 203(a), 206(a)(6)(iii)206(a)(6)(iv), 208(a)-208(d), 21 1(c)-21 1(d), 212, 215, 219, 220(a)-220(c).
36. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 100.2, §§ 1-2(M)(2), 2(N)(2), 2(N)(3), 2(N)(5), 2(N)(1 1)
(1977).
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.501-718.508 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-62
(Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.599,
91.602, 91.606, 91.608, 91.611, 91.614, 91.617, 91.621, 91.623, 91.626, 91.641, 91.643, 91.646, 91.649,
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contains such a provision 38 and the U.C.A. has an optional provision of
39
a similar nature.
Despite apparent consensus for the need for this legislation among
the states addressing the issue, there are significant differences in the
provisions which have been adopted. These differences reflect significant differences in public policy and may affect the relative efficacy of
the statutes in protecting the condominium purchaser. A careful analysis of the statutes will illustrate these differences and will provide an
insight into the degree of consideration given the various interests and
the potential effectiveness and workability of the statutes.
Limitations on the ContractDuration
The most drastic remedy for long-term management contracts
would be to make them voidable by the association at any time after
control is transferred from the developer. The Florida Condominium
Act comes the closest to this extreme. It allows any management contract to be terminated upon affirmative vote of seventy-five percent of
the unit owners 40 other than the developer. Next is the U.C.A. which
provides that any management contract which was unconscionable at
the time of formation may be terminated by a board elected by the unit
owners after ninety days notice. 4' The proposed Condominium Act of
1978 requires that management contracts be voidable after the developer's control has ended and upon ninety days notice.4 2 It further provides that any contract between the unit owner and the developer, or
affiliate, which has a term of two years or more is terminable upon a
43
vote of the unit owners.
A more restrictive provision has been employed in four states. 4 In
Illinois, for example, any management contract which extends beyond
45
two years may be cancelled by a majority vote of the unit owners
during the ninety day period following the expiration of the two years.
Maryland and Louisiana have very similar provisions, differing only in
91.652, 91.656, 91.658, 91.661, 91.664, 91.667, 91.671 (1977); VA. CODE §§ 55-79.86, 55-79.89, 5579.90 (Supp. 1976). See text accompanying notes 92-110, infra.
38. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at §§ 201(22), 202(b), 270(b), 208,
215-218.
39. U.C.A., supra note 8, at §§ 5-101 through 5-110.
40.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.302 (West Supp. 1978).

41. U.C.A., supra note 8, at § 3-105.
42. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 205(a)(1 1).
43. Id at § 209.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1138 (West Supp.
LAWS ANN. § 559.24

1976); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-125 (Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP.
(West Supp. 1978).
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978).
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the time period allowed. 4 6 Michigan varies the pattern somewhat by
permitting cancellation during the first ninety days following termination of the developer's control, for any reason. Thereafter the association is permitted to cancel only for cause and after giving the developer
47
thirty days notice.
The chief advantage of the more restrictive variations of this precept is that they encourage owners' associations to scrutinize the contracts which they inherit from the developer-controlled association. In
addition, they encourage the developer to execute commercially reasonable contracts which will survive scrutiny. The developer is not
forestalled from contracting with himself or an affiliate, but is encouraged to exercise restraint in the terms of the contract. On the other
hand, the developer is vulnerable to the vagaries of the association,
which may cancel the contract without any justifiable reason. If this
occurs, the developer loses some of his ability to protect his investment
in any unsold units. However, he is provided some measure of protection by those statutes which allow cancellation only by a vote of more
than a majority of the unit owners. Furthermore, by explicitly stating
the period in which cancellation is permitted, four states have forced
48
the associations to act promptly so as not to lose the privilege.
A variation which affords the developer a greater measure of protection has been adopted in six other states. 49 Under this method, management contracts are limited to a specific term of years, ranging from
one year in Hawaii 50 to seven years for a "staged" condominium in
Oregon.5 1 These statutes give the developer the security of knowing
that he will have a major influence on the management of the condominium during the period of heaviest sales activity. This is the period
during which he is seeking to recover his investment and realize a reasonable profit. Unfortunately, the association remains at the mercy of
the developer during this period. During the term of the contract, the
association would have no remedy if the developer chose to realize
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1138 (West Supp. 1976); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-125
(Supp. 1977).
47. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978).

48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1138 (West Supp.
1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-125 (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24

(West 1967 & Supp. 1978).
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-74b(a) (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-84 (Supp. 1977); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 515.195(2) (West Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.557 (1977); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 43-15A-24 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 55-79.74(b) (Supp. 1976).
50. HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-84 (Supp. 1977).
51. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.557 (1977). A "staged" condominium is a condominium which is

intended to be developed over a period of years with individual segments completed at different
times.
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some quick profits. Utah, however, has gone to the other extreme. It
provides that management contracts must be specifically ratified or renewed by a majority of the unit owners.5 2 Here the developer is afforded virtually no protection after control has been transferred.
These differing approaches illustrate the conflicting interests which
must be considered. A developer who contracts for management services with his own, or a related firm, should not be assumed to be primarily interested in realizing excessive profits. The developer has a
significant financial interest in the project until all of the units have
been sold. Poor management could easily reduce the desirability of the
condominium, thereby making it more difficult to sell the units. Many
developers legitimately seek to control the management of the condominium for that very reason.
However, it is also clear that the interest of the developer in protecting his investment is not of indefinite duration. There is a point at
which the unit owners' interest in controlling their own affairs outweighs the developer's interest. For this reason those statutes which
permit binding management contracts for a specified period of time
seem to represent the best balancing of interests.
Transfer of Control
The ability of the developer to bind the association to a management contract is also diminished by provisions which require control of
the association to be transferred to the unit owners within a certain
time. Six states 5 3 have statutes which require transition to be complete
within three to seven years from the initial sale to a party other than the
developer. The length of time allowed depends upon whether the condominium is a single development or an expandable development
---one which is developed in stages.5 4 This approach has also been
adopted by the U.C.A.5 5 and the proposed Condominium Act of
1978.56 In addition, Florida 57 and Connecticut 58 provide for a phase-in
of unit owner control as greater percentages of units are sold.
Statutes which limit the duration of contracts and those which pro52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-16.5(2) (Supp. 1977).
53.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-74a (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.301(1) (West Supp. 1978);

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1633e(a), 85-1633e(c) (1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-16.5(I)(a) (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 55-79.74(a) (Supp. 1976).
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1633e(a)(3) (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-16.5(l)(a) (Supp.
1978); VA. CODE § 55-79.74(a) (Supp. 1976).
55. U.C.A., supra note 8, at §§ 3-103(c), 3-103(d).
56. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 205(a)(3).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.301 (West Supp. 1978).
58. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-74a(d) (1977).
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vide for the transfer of control of the condominium association have as
a common element the placement of an absolute limitation upon the
time during which the developer will have control over the management of the development. However, there is also a distinct difference
between these two approaches. Limiting the duration of contracts
forces the association to reconsider its management needs at a specific
point in time. The association is thereby forced to contract on its own
behalf, to strike its own bargain, and, obviously, to make its own mistakes. This method also automatically terminates favorable contracts,
and could conceivably result in the loss of an advantageous contract,
due to changed market conditions. Although empirical data is unavailable, it is possible also that this approach is open to opportunistic exploitation. There is nothing to prevent formation of a short-term
contract with highly inflated rates, which would continue the former
abuses on a smaller scale.
On the other hand, transfer of control permits the association to
consider the contracts on their merits and does not force undesirable
termination. These types of provisions could encourage developers to
form commercially reasonable contracts at the outset and to perform
management functions efficiently in the hope of a continued relationship. Such a relationship would result in steady, even though less spectacular, profits for a longer period after the development of the project
is completed. Of course, an indolent association might fail to extricate
itself; but at least the terms of the contract would not be forced upon
the association by the developer. Perhaps the best way to blend these
two types of provisions is to provide for mandatory transfer of control
and to grant the owner-controlled board the option to terminate without cause at a specified time in the future. 59 While the board might
treat a developer unfairly by cancelling on a whim, the board would be
guaranteed the right to contract on its own behalf. In addition, the
developer's interests are protected during the period in which the initial
59. See, e.g., the following excerpt from the Illinois statute:
vested in...
Until election of the initial board of managers, the same rights, ...
the board of managers by this Act and in the declaration and by-laws shall be held and
performed by the developer. The election of the initial board of managers shall be held
not later than 60 days after the conveyance by the developer of 75% of the units or 3
years after the recording of the declaration, whichever is earlier. If the initial board of
managers is not elected by the unit owners at the time so established, the developer shall
continue in office for a period of 30 days whereupon written notice of his resignation
shall be sent to all of the unit owners entitled to vote at such election. . ..
Any contract, lease, or other agreement made prior to the election of a majority of
the board of managers other than the developer by or on behalf of unit owners . . .
which extends for a period of more than 2 years from the recording of the declaration,
shall be subject to cancellation . . ..
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.2 (Supp. 1978). See also VA. CODE § 55-79.74(b)(1) (Supp. 1976).
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investment is recovered, and are protected to a lesser extent as the community's interest in self-determination begins to outweigh the developer's interests.
Disclosure
By limiting the contract term or giving the association some cancellation rights, the legislatures have placed the primary burden upon
the developer to execute fair contracts and to protect his interests in
some other way. In addition, by requiring the developer to transfer
control after a specified period, the legislatures have taken the burden
off both the developer and the purchasers. In contrast, mandatory disclosure of a "sweetheart" contract and/or its terms to potential purchasers may shift the burden to the purchaser. Barring fraud or
misleading statements, the purchaser who has been informed and
thereafter signs a purchase agreement is presumed to have determined
that the contract is commercially fair and reasonable. He probably will
not be able to challenge the contract at a later date.60 Therefore the
effectiveness of disclosure statutes is largely dependent upon the
amount and type of information disclosed, the availability of comparative data, the relative expertise of the purchaser and/or his counsel, and
the enforcement procedures available.
Perhaps the most crucial consideration is: what must be disclosed?
In seven states, the purchaser must be provided with a copy of the contract itself.6 1 While this approach is probably the most informative, it
is not without some drawbacks. The contract on its face may not reveal
the interest of the developer in the management company, nor would
the technical language of the contract necessarily be comprehensible to
the average purchaser. Since most condominium purchasers should be
represented by competent counsel, this point is more in the nature of a
warning than a serious obstacle. However, it would be necessary under
this type of legislation for a buyer's attorney to intelligently examine
the contract to determine its effect upon his client in the future and to
consider whether the terms therein are commercially reasonable.
A less informative approach has been adopted by Oregon, 62 Louisiana, 63 and the city of Chicago 64 and has been proposed in the
60. See text accompanying notes 11-20, supra.
61.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-7 1b (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(e) (West Supp. 1978);

GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1643e(b)(5) (1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-124(b)(4) (Supp.
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.215(4) (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 55-79.90(4) (Supp. 1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 703.33(i)(c) (Supp. 1978).

62. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.602(l)(i)(c) (1977).
63.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1140A(5) (West Supp. 1978).
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U.C.A. 6 5 and the proposed Condominium Act of 1978.66 These statutes require only that the developer make available a description of the
contract rather than the document itself.67 The effectiveness of these
statutes in protecting purchasers depends primarily upon the completeness of the disclosure. Certainly it is likely that the average purchaser
will be more able to comprehend clearly drafted descriptive statements
than technical contractual language. However, there is also more possibility for omissions, misleading statements, or intentionally vague
wording unless there are sufficient enforcement provisions to discourage obfuscation and encourage candor and clarity.
In Hawaii, 68 Illinois 69 and Michigan 70 the developer is only required to disclose the costs and expenses of management. While this
information may be useful in determining the actual cost of the
purchase, it does little to help the purchaser identify the developer's
interest or to make the purchaser aware of renewal clauses or escalation
clauses. Connecticut, 7 t Louisiana 72 and Virginia 73 have attempted to
bolster this requirement by mandating that any interest the developer
has in the management firm be disclosed as well. This particular re74
quirement, which is also in the proposed Condominium Act of 1978,
is extremely important for the purchaser to determine the fairness of a
particular contract.
The effectiveness of a disclosure statute depends largely upon the
availability of private remedies and/or public enforcement. In this regard there are two basic questions: what happens if no disclosure is
made, and what happens if the disclosure is fraudulent or misleading?
64. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 100.2, §§ 1-2(M)(2), 2(N)(2) (1977).
65. U.C.A., supra note 8, at § 4-102.
66. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 206(a)(6)(iii).
67. The following is illustrative of this type of provision:
A. Prior to each sale or execution of a contract to sell a condominium unit, the seller
must make full disclosure of, and provide to the other party to the agreement the follow-

ing information:
(5)
A written statement indicating whether the developer has entered into or intends to
enter into a contract for the management of the condominium property. With respect to

any such contract, this statement shall specify in detail, the services to be rendered, the
amount or estimate of the costs to be incurred thereunder and the duration thereof, in-

cluding any renewal provisions, and any relationship, whether direct or indirect, between
the seller and the person to perform such management services; ....
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1140A(5) (West Supp. 1978).
68. HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-61(a) (Supp. 1977).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 322(c) (1977).
70. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978).
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-71b (1977).
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1140A(5) (West Supp. 1978).
73. VA. CODE § 55-79.90(4) (Supp. 1976).
74. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 206(a)(6)(iv).
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The most frequent response to the former question is that sales
contracts are unenforceable unless full disclosure has been made. 75 A
variation on this theme is to hold the sales contract voidable by the
purchaser until full disclosure has been made. 76 In both cases, the purchaser is frequently given a maximum period of time, usually fifteen
days, in which to peruse the disclosed information before the sales contract becomes enforceable and binding. 77 In Virginia, a disclosure
statement must be prepared in accordance with the statute before a permit to sell is issued by the Virginia Real Estate Commission. 78 While
any of these provisions is likely to be effective in forcing compliance,
the primary benefit of the Virginia statute would seem to be that disclosure would be guaranteed at the outset. Under the more popular approach of granting an express right of rescission there is also a greater
possibility of confusion. "Full disclosure" of all relevant information is
a subjective phrase. The developer may feel that he has fully disclosed
the relevant terms, only to find the purchaser disagreeing.
Compliance with the mechanics of disclosure may be insufficient
to adequately protect the rights of the purchaser. Additional protection
is needed in the case of fraudulent or misleading disclosure. The private remedy most frequently provided is rescission of the sales contract.
The language usually employed is very similar to that found in the
Hawaii statute:
may knowNo officer, agent, or employee of any company,.
ingly authorize, direct, or aid in the publication, .... of any false
statement or representation . . . and no person may issue, circulate,
publish, or distribute any advertisement, pamphlet, prospectus, or
letter . . . which contains an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein made in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made not misleading.
Every sale made in violation of [the foregoing section] is voidable at the election of the purchaser. .... 79
In the case of management contracts, information which might fall
within the purview of this statute would include statements relating to
costs of management, the share of the costs apportioned to the specific
unit being purchased, the relationship, if any, between the developer
75. The Georgia statute, for example, prohibits execution of a sales contract earlier than
seven days after full disclosure to the prospective purchaser. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1643e(b)
(1978). A similar provision, absent a specific time limitation, has been enacted in Hawaii. HAW.
REV. STAT.

76.
77.
78.
79.

§ 514A-62 (Supp. 1977).

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.502(1) (West Supp. 1978).
See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-124(d) (Supp. 1978).
VA. CODE § 55-79.89(a) (Supp. 1976).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-68 through 514A-69 (Supp. 1977).
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and the managing agent, and clauses relating to renewal of the contract, penalties for nonperformance or accelerated cancellation, and
possibly those which are exculpatory. Seven other states have some
provision for rescission of the sales contract if the statutory anti-fraud
provisions are violated.8 0 Florida 8' and Michigan 82 permit a purchaser
to seek damages if the disclosure is fraudulent or misleading. This type
of provision seems to be an extremely important method for encouraging good faith disclosure. Permitting the purchaser to take direct action
for the redress of wrongful disclosure, provides him the opportunity to
recoup his losses in addition to extricating himself. These provisions
do not seem to be overly burdensome for the developer who engages in
good faith sales practices. He would be less likely to be sued and
would be likely to successfully defend, albeit at some cost.
In addition to the foregoing private remedies, several enactments
afford some form of public enforcement. Penalties in the form of fines
or even imprisonment are provided for in Virginia, 83 Oregon, 84 Georgia, 85 Chicago, 86 and in the Condominium Act of 1978.87 In addition,
Oregon has empowered the real estate commission to adopt rules and
regulations and issue cease and desist orders. 88 Michigan has similarly
empowered the department of commerce to regulate the form of disclosure and to refuse to issue a permit to sell. 89 The Division of Florida
Land Sales and Condominiums also has been given rule-making power
and the authority to seek cease and desist orders. 90 The optional enforcement agency proposed in the U.C.A. has similar powers. 9'
Administrative and Supervisory Agencies
Some mention should also be made of the role of administrative
and supervisory agencies in protecting purchasers. 92 This discussion
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.502 (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1643e(i)(4) (1978);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 322(d) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-1140C (Supp. 1978); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-124(d) (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.215(15)(6)(a) (West Supp.

1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.33(1) (Supp. 1978). See also U.C.A., supra note 8, at § 4-106.
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.506(I) (West Supp. 1978).
82. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978).
83. VA. CODE § 55-79.103 (Supp. 1976).
84. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.664 (1977).
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1643e(k) (1978).
86. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 100.2, §§ 2-11 (1977).
87. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 212.
88. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.602(1), 91.667 (1977).
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978).
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.501 (West Supp. 1978).

91. U.C.A., supra note 8, at §§ 5-101 through 5-110.
92. A comprehensive discussion of the different types of agencies, their powers, duties, and
their effectiveness, is beyond the scope of this article.
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will be helpful in understanding the protection available under the
more recent statutes. Several of the states seem to pattern their agency
after the SEC. For example, some form of registration is required of
the developer by Florida, 93 Michigan, 94 Oregon, 95 Virginia, 96 and the
U.C.A. 9 7 In connection with the registration process the developer is
also required to prepare some form of public offering statement, 98 similar to an SEC approved prospectus. 99 Such a statement is also required
by Hawaii'°° and in the proposed Condominium Act of 1978.101 It is in
the public offering statement that management contracts must be disclosed.
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The foregoing requirements are aimed primarily at gathering information and making it available to the ultimate purchaser and the
administrative agency. The paramount feature of the statutes empowering these agencies is the establishment of enforcement procedures.
Four of the five states which have authorized this agency, specifically
grant it the power to investigate and supervise condominium sales. 103
Thus, an agency would be capable of inquiring into any ambiguities or
potentially false or misleading representations concerning management
contracts. Assuming that the agency is properly funded and aggressive,
this power will be of particular importance in determining whether
there is any relationship between the developer and agent which would
be detrimental to an association or individual unit owner.
Florida, 0 4 Michigan, 105 Oregonl 0 6 and Virginia 107 go even further
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.501-718.508 (West Supp. 1978).
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978).
95. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.599-91.671 (1977).
96. VA. CODE §§ 55-79.86, 55-79.89, 55-79.90 (Supp. 1976).
97. U.C.A. supra note 8, at §§ 5-102 through 5-106.
98. The Virginia statute, for example, specifically states that public offering statements for
offers of units currently registered with the Securities Division of the State Corporation Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission are presumed to be in compliance with the statutory reqirements. VA. CODE § 55-79.90(d) (Supp. 1976).
The Florida and Oregon statutes also contain very detailed requirements regarding the form,
wording, and even the required type size to be used in the disclosure statement. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 718.504 (West Supp. 1978) and OR. REV. STAT. § 91.617 (1977).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976).
100. HAw. REV. STAT. § 514A-62 (Supp. 1977) (no registration requirement).
101. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 206 (no registration requirement).
102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(2)(e) (West Supp. 1978). See also text accompanying notes 60-82, supra.
103. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.501(!) (West Supp. 1978); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24
(West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.664, 91.667 (1977); VA. CODE § 55-79.98 (Supp. 1975).

See also U.C.A., supra note 8, at §§ 5-107, 5-110; The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra
note 7, at § 208.
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.501(i)(b) (West Supp. 1978).
105. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.24 (West Supp. 1978).
106. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.664, 91.667 (1977).
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by granting power to impose sanctions such as cease and desist orders,
to institute judicial proceedings, and to compel testimony. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978 has similar provisions. 0 8 While the
U.C.A. grants power to issue cease and desist orders, it does not grant
the power to seek judicial enforcement of its orders. 10 9 These powers
are important tools which can provide significant protection for purchasers if they are vigorously utilized. However, lax enforcement could
result in additional damage to purchasers. The existence of these agencies could tend to lull a potential purchaser into a false sense of security, thereby causing a decrease in diligence on his part. Under the
reasoning in Fountainview, 10 a purchaser operating under such a delusion who discovers his error after signing the closing agreement would
have difficulty in obtaining redress, unless intentional fraud could be
shown. On the other hand, overly enthusiastic enforcement could result in harassment of developers and would have a stifling effect upon
the condominium market. The amount of documentation already required under the disclosure statutes is overwhelming. Governmental
regulation at any level is likely to increase the bureaucratic burden on
the erstwhile developer.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that developers are gradually being limited in their ability to bind associations to management
contracts which are not in the association's best interests. The thrust of
the current legislation seems to be to limit the term for which a contract
may be binding while permitting the developer at least a modicum of
protection against poor management decisions. In addition, there is a
general trend toward forced disclosure of material information, which
includes some disclosure of information regarding management contracts. These disclosure requirements are generally bolstered by public
and private enforcement procedures, including direct governmental
regulation.
The result of this approach is to emphasize informed consent on
the part of the purchaser. There is no limitation on the content of the
contract, nor is a contract which involves the developer on both sides
summarily prohibited. Thus, the duty to examine the contract falls
107. VA. CODE §§ 55-79.98 through 55-79.101, 55-79.103 (Supp. 1976).
108. The proposed Condominium Act of 1978, supra note 7, at § 208.
109. U.C.A., supra note 8, at § 5-105.
110. 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. App. 1967), cert. discharged, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968). See text
accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
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upon the purchaser, whose primary recourse is to decline to purchase,
buttressed by the possibility of rescission of the sales contract under
certain circumstances. While there is certainly incentive for a developer to deal fairly in contracting for management services, it is still
possible for an unwary buyer to find himself paying unnecessarily high
fees for a number of years as a result of his carelessness.

